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ARGUMENT 
THE TRIAL COURT INCORRECTLY QUIETS TITLE TO THE 
THIRTY-FOOT BY SIXTY-ONE FOOT STRIP OF PROPERTY 
Respondents, Melvin Fletcher and Peggy Fletcher 
("Fletchers"), state that the trial court based its decision on 
title by deed and operation of law and not on title by adverse 
possession. (Brief of Respondents at 14) This statement is 
incorrect and not supported by the evidence* The trial court 
ruled as follows: 
In this case, the Plaintiff filed suit 
August 20th of 1980 seeking to quiet title in 
itself for property acquired from United Park 
Mines Company through John J, Sweeney on 
February the 15th, 1980, specifically challeng-
ing the claims of Defendants Fletcher to the 
so-called 30-foot strip of disputed property, 
and the claims of Defendants Kimball to the 
Hercihiser [sic] parcel and the 30-foot strip; 
Defendants Fletcher and Plaintiff basically 
have resolved their disagreement by interim 
conveyances pursuant to stipulation. 
Consequently, Defendants Fletcher make no 
substantive claim to the Hercihiser parcel. 
Defendants Fletcher claim interest in the 
disputed 30-foot strip by adverse possession of 
said parcel by open notorious hostile use of 
the same contrary to the interest of the 
Defendants Kimball, and the Plaintiff, for in 
excess of the requisite seven years required 
and/or alternatively by prescriptive easement 
against all other parties on essentially the 
same grounds for a period in excess of 20 
years. Defendants Fletcher likewise claim an 
undivided one-half interest as co-tenants in 
what I should call the principal Kimball parcel 
by deed from Elizabeth Kimball on May the 19th, 
1981, Exhibit 17, she having acquired that 
interest in the same from her late husband, 
Robert Kimball. 
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Defendants Kimball claim on the contrary 
that the original co-tenancy between Robert and 
Gilbert Kimball was terminated either by 
disclaimer and/or adverse possession against 
Robert Kimball. They likewise claim title to 
the Hercihiser property and 30-foot strip by 
survey and resist the claim of Fletcher to the 
30-foot strip by claiming permissive use by 
Fletchers and/or their predecessors in 
interest, the Workmans. 
Title 78-12-7 et seq. the Utah Code 
Annotated, states the statutory grounds for 
certain presumptions that arise in adverse 
possession cases, specifically if the property 
is held by the party claiming such an interest 
as interpreted by the Utah Supreme Court, and 
said use is continuous, open and notorious to 
the record title owner's interest for at least 
seven years prior to the commencement of the 
suit, the assumption is that the adverse use 
party has legal title. Prescriptive easement 
claims are essentially the same as adverse 
possession claims except that the presumption 
arises in favor of the user after at least 20 
years adverse use. Zollinger v. Frank, 172 
P.2d 714, 1946 case, and the original principal 
case in Utah, Harkness v. Woodmansee, 7 Utah 
227, the evidence in this case has established 
to my satisfaction by a preponderance that the 
Fletchers have used adversely, openly and 
notoriously the disputed 30-foot strip parcel 
as against the Defendants Kimball sufficient to 
raise the requisite presumption their claim is 
a matter of right either under the theory of 
adverse possession or prescriptive easement. 
In my judgment Defendants Kimball have failed, 
in this court's view, to rebut said presumption 
by failing to carry their burden to establish 
that said adverse use was purely permissive. 
It is this court's judgment that the 
Defendants' Kimball's reliance on the deeds 
between themselves of 1977 on the basis of the 
1976 Jones survey is misplaced. Mr. Jones 
himself testified that his survey was based in 
large part on Gilbert Kimball's instructions as 
to what were the boundaries of the property, 
which I find to be in error. Accordingly, 
title is quieted on the 30-foot strip in the 
Defendants Fletcher. I find for similar 
reasons that no claim to the Hercihiser parcel 
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is superior to that of the Plaintiff. Title to 
that parcel is quieted in the Plaintiff. 
[Emphasis added] 
The trial court awards the thirty-foot strip to 
Fletchers based upon title by adverse possession and not title by 
deed as asserted by Fletchers. (R. 439) The court instructed 
counsel for Fletchers to prepare the Finding of Facts and 
Conclusions of Law. 
Fletchers cannot support a claim for the thirty-foot 
strip based upon title by adverse possession because Fletchers 
have never paid taxes on the property. (T. 179) Because 
Fletchers cannot support the trial court's ruling, Fletchers 
create a new legal theory that the trial court awarded the 
ownership of the property based on title by deed and operation of 
law. 
The Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law are 
ambiguous, uncertain and not supported by the evidence under any 
legal theory which Fletchers seek to adopt. In their brief the 
Fletchers claim that the 1940 Tax Deed is the only valid route of 
title and that Sweeney fails to meet its burden in establishing 
its claim to the property. 
A. 1940 Tax Deed. 
Fletchers claim the evidence demonstrates that the 1940 
Tax Deed from Summit County to Gilbert J. Kimball and Robert W. 
Kimball (Appellant's Brief, Exhibit "D") and as amended by the 
1976 Quit-Claim Deed (Plaintiff's Exhibit 4, p. 101) constitutes 
the only valid route of title to the thirty-foot strip of 
property. (Respondents' Brief at 1) The 1940 tax deed reflects 
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the plain Intent of Summit County to convey to the Klmballs a 98T 
x 77f parcel of property. The prior deeds Illustrating the 
history of conveyances on the property describe a 98T x 77? 
parcel of property. (Appellant's Brief, Exhibits "Eff and "F") 
This court has held that a description of property in a deed is 
prima facie an expression of the intention of the grantor. 
Hartman v. Potter, 596 P.2d 653 (Utah 1979). 
Fletchers claim the property contained in the 1976 
Quit-Claim Deed actually encompasses the property which was 
supposed to be conveyed by Summit County in the 1940 tax deed. 
Such an argument defeats the intent of Summit County as en-
compassed in the unambiguous terms of the 1940 tax deed,. Summit 
County never intended to convey a 98f x 77f parcel together with 
the thirty-foot strip and the Hershiser piece of property in the 
1940 tax deed. 
As the trial court states at page 4 of its ruling, the 
basis for the 1976 Jones survey which created the legal de-
scription contained in the 1976 Quit-Claim Deed was Gilbert 
Kimball's instructions to Mr. Jones as to what were the 
boundaries of the property. The trial court states that the 
reliance of Gilbert Kimball on the 1976 deed on the basis of the 
1976 survey of Mr. Jones is misplaced and is in error. 
' BY Sweeney's Ownership Interest. 
Fletchers attack Sweeney!s claim to the property by 
stating that Sweeney did not meet its burden of proof in 
demonstrating title to the thirty-foot strip. Fletchers state 
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that no where in Sweeney's claim to the chain of title is the 
eastern boundary of the thirty-foot strip established, 
(Respondent's Brief at 7) 
Sweeney establishes its ownership interest to the 
thirty-foot strip under the deeds contained in the abstract of 
title. These deeds include descriptions of the thirty-foot strip 
extending from Park Avenue to the scalehouse and warehouse 
located at Pacific Avenue. For example, the Deed and Conveyance 
from Silver King Coalition Mines Company to United Park City 
Mines Company, recorded May 26, 1953, and found at page 92 of the 
abstract of title, refers to the following description of 
property: 
Also a strip of land 30 feet wide front 
and rear and extending from the easterly side 
of Park Avenue to the right of way granted by 
George G. Snyder, deceased, by Deed dated 
November 13, 1883, and situated between the 
scalehouse and warehouse of E. Kimball, being 
the same strip of land over which the Park City 
Smelting Company was granted a right-of-way of 
record. 
Sweeney's expert establishes the location and 
boundaries of the thirty-foot strip from the legal descriptions 
contained in the deeds and from the location of the remains of 
the scalehouse and warehouse. (T. 48-51) 
Fletchers cite Howard v. Howard, 12 Utah 2d 407, 367 
P.2d 193 (1962) for the proposition that a deed which does not 
sufficiently describe boundaries to render them capable of 
reasonable ascertainment does not convey any interest. 
(Respondents' Brief at 8) In this case the court also 
establishes that a grantor's intention with respect to a 
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description of real property should be given effect if reasonably 
determinable. Id. at 195. The use by Sweeney of the series of 
deeds describing the location and extension of the thirty-foot 
strip of property from Park Avenue to Pacific Avenue indicates 
the intent of the grantors under the various deeds to convey a 
thirty-foot strip of property from the base of Park Avenue to 
Pacific Avenue where the remains of the scalehouse and warehouse 
are located. 
Sweeney establishes its ownership interest to the 
thirty-foot strip from the deeds contained in the abstract of 
title. In addition, Sweeney and its predecessors in interest are 
the only entities to have paid taxes on the thirty-foot strip of 
property. 
CONCLUSION 
The Judgment and Decree of Quiet Title should be 
reversed and this court should quiet title in the name of Sweeney 
to the thirty-foot strip of property. The evidence clearly 
preponderates against the Findings of Pact and Conclusions of 
Law. Neither the Kimballs nor the Fletchers are entitled to any 
ownership interest in the thirty-foot strip of property under any 
legal theory set forth by either party. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this _/£_ day of December, 1986. 
BIELE, HASLAM & HATCH 
/ „ -.>-- /i f y / • x' •' ' 
Paul D. Veasy \J 
Attorneys for Plaintiff and 
Appellant, Sweeney Land Company 
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AFFIDAVIT OF MAILING 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
: ss. 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
PAUL D. VEASY, being duly sworn, says: 
That he Is employed in the office of Blele, Haslam 
8c Hatch, P.O. attorneys for Plaintiff and Appellant, Sweeney Land 
Company. 
That he mailed four (4) true and accurate copies of 
Plaintiff and Appellant's Reply Brief upon the parties to the 
within described action by placing a true and correct copy 
thereof in an envelope addressed to 
Robert Felton, Esq. 
Attorney for Defendants and Respondents, 
Gilbert Kimball and Maud Kimball 
5 Triad Center, Suite 585 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84180 
Gerald Kinghorn, Esq. 
KAPALOSKI, KINGHORN & PETERS 
Attorneys for Counterclaim-crossclaimants and 
Respondents, Melvin Fletcher and Peggy Fletcher 
9 Exchange Place, Suite 1000 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
and by placing the same with the United States Post Office, first 
class, postage prepaid, on the _/£-day of December, 1986. 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this \Jl day of 
December, 1986. 
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